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I 
In 55 B.C., Julius Caesar was actively involved in a campaign against the native peoples 
of Gaul.  The Gallic rebels had proven to be a challenge to the invading Roman armies which 
Caesar led from 58 to 52 B.C.  However, in the midst of this conflict, Caesar made the unusual 
decision to turn his attention to a new locale, Britain.  With one campaign currently underway, 
we must ask ourselves; why would Caesar turn his focus elsewhere when it wasn’t an imminent 
threat?  What did he hope to accomplish by this action? What after-effects did Caesar’s 
campaign have on both Britain and Rome respectively? 
Caesar’s invasions in 55-54 B.C. had a dramatic effect on shaping the histories of both 
the Roman Empire and the Isle of Britain.  His operations influenced the world in many different 
ways; economically, politically, and socially. Through the course of this paper, I shall attempt to 
identify what Caesar’s rationale was for invading and what he achieved based on Caesar’s own 
writings in conjunction with the archeological and historical evidence gathered through 
secondary sources.  Then, I will analyze and compare the results of the invasion that Caesar 
believes he accomplished with modern historians’ views to determine the successfulness of his 
campaign.  Along with challenging Caesar’s point of view concerning the Romano-British 
incursion, I will closely examine the impact of the Roman Empire on Britain society and vice 
versa.    
Caesar’s personal journals regarding the conflict can be found in his De Bello Gallico, 
translated as The Battle for Gaul, which explains in some detail his intentions and, more 
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importantly, what he believes to have accomplished as a result of this undertaking.  Caesar wrote 
these volumes as a way of showing the average Roman citizens the glory he had achieved 
through his exploits in Gaul and Britain.  Since Caesar began his campaign in Gaul in 58 B.C., 
these documents were created to remind the Romans of Caesar’s accomplishments in the name 
of Rome despite his nine year absence.  The book may also have been intended as an answer to 
political opponents of Caesar, who questioned the necessity of such a costly war which, at the 
time, one of the most expensive in Roman history.       
There seems to be a distinct shift or evolution if you will, from older and more traditional 
writings to the contemporary examinations of Caesar’s accomplishments in regards to the 
campaign into Britain.  Results of this invasion are primarily viewed in two ways. The first is the 
traditional view of Roman influence on Britain and its peoples as shown in the writings of 
Sheppard Frere, Robin Collingwood, and Peter Salway.  The second is the more modern 
approach which best shown in Martin Millett’s work, The Romanization of Britain.  In this 
approach, the emphasis is placed on the examination of Britain’s impact on Rome.  Historians of 
this event seem to focus on archeological evidence.  
Until the 2000’s, the traditional approach of Historians strictly focusing on evidence of 
Roman influence in Britain through standard archeological confirmation of Caesar’s 
accomplishments was the only pursued avenue.  This train of thought is adapted to include social 
and cultural aspects derived from other social sciences.  Millett describes the principle 
differences in this modernistic methodology in his preface, “A review of the evidence seems 
especially important since members…are seeking new explanations for cultural change in the 
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Roman world: they are unwilling to accept the paternalistic view that ‘the Britons did what they 
were told by the Romans because it represented ‘progress’.”1
The first source which I will be considering is Collingwood’s Roman Britain and the 
English Settlements.  Robin George Collingwood was a British philosopher and historian who 
wrote three texts on the subject of Roman Britain.  Collingwood seems to focus most of his 
attention on archeological evidence within the chronology of the documented events.  They also 
address the ramifications of Caesar on the Romanization of Britain and its affect thereafter on 
British culture.  Collingwood describes in preface the exact goal of his writings as to, begin with 
Julius Caesar’s first reconnaissance mission, analyze the state of the isle and its people during 55 
and 54 B.C.  The portions of Collingwood’s writings that I am most interested in for the purpose 
of this paper are the selections on Pre-Roman Britain and its communications with mainland 
Europe as well as the detailed account he gives of Caesar’s invasions, and the influences Caesar 
left in his wake.  Collingwood’s perspective is heavily influence from the British point-of-view.  
“In writing this study of Roman Britain, my aim has been to make a contribution to the history of 
Britain, regarded as a region with a personality of its own…”
 
2
Collingwood chose Julius Caesar’s invasion of Britain as the starting point for his history 
because, as mentioned above, he supports the idea that the effects of the invasion helped to shape 
the increasing impact of Britain on Europe as a whole.  He seems to argue that Caesar’s actions 
and the influence of the Roman Empire where crucial in the overall development of Britain.  His 
research resulted in a bi-lateral view in which Rome was the most affected, but still 
acknowledges the substantial changes within the Isle of Britain as well.             
   
                                                             
1 Millet, Romanization of Britain, xv. 
2 Collingwood and Myres,  Roman Britain, vi. 
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The second source of note that should be reviewed is Dr. Sheppard Sunderland Frere’s 
work entitled Britannia.  Frere, like Collingwood, was a British historian and archeologist.  
While Frere uses the conventional outlook of Rome’s effect on Britain, he takes a different 
approach to researching the material which is opposite from historians such as Collingwood and 
Millett.  He focuses his writing solely on interpreting Caesar’s actual endeavors instead of the 
archeological results and affects on British society.  Frere does mention post-invasion Britain at 
some length including a section on Commius and the chapter on the impact the invasions had on 
Rome is covered in a different way than prior volumes on the subject. 
The third text analyzed in this study is Peter Salway’s The Frontier People of Roman 
Britain.  He writes on the Roman influence over the peoples that they conquered, and gives little 
thought to Britain’s role in changing the Roman Empire.  This is very helpful as it is the opposite 
of Millett’s work; therefore it gives the reader a nice contrast.  Salway seems to believe that 
Caesar’s invasion marked the beginning of Britain as a “true” civilization.  He gives little to no 
credence to British society, culture, or any other British development prior to Roman occupation 
of the region.   
His reasoning for this view of the invasion as a “Roman conquest” is derived from the 
advancement of the Roman imperialistic ideals and culture on Britain and its peoples.  “…they 
[Romans] represent for Britain something new: four centuries of a cosmopolitan society with the 
basic elements of true civilization – an altogether greater magnitude of security, personal 
freedom, justice, literacy and prosperity than at any previous time…”3
 
   
                                                             
3 Salway, Roman Britain, xii. 
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The final source that is necessary to provide an opposing view from those previous 
expressed is Martin Millett’s The Romanization of Britain.  Millet’s work helps to indentify the 
impact of Britain on Rome as opposed to the traditional view of Britain’s incorporation into the 
empire.  His text is an in-depth analysis of what “Romanization”, a term originally coined by 
Theodor Mommsen4, means.  The concept of Romanization is a complex one.  According to 
Millett, Romanization was not a complete domination of one culture over another, but rather a 
process of blending or merging Roman society into another culture.  “We must thus see 
Romanization as a process of dialectical change, rather than influence of one ‘pure’ culture upon 
others.  Roman culture interacted with native cultures to produce the synthesis that we call 
Romanized.”5
II 
  
Caesar’s first invasion of the Isle of Britain seems to open up a plethora of plausible 
explanations as to his motivations for embarking on such a monumental.  Caesar himself cited 
his rationale for the endeavor as first and foremost being a military decision.  “…I knew that in 
almost all of our campaigns in Gaul our enemies had received reinforcements from the Britons”6
According to J.P.V.D. Balsdon, the decision to send an expedition to Britain had been 
devised a year prior to the actual invasion: “The notion was in his mind, perhaps, in early 56, 
indeed when he was at Luca, and it may well have been for this project that those ships had been 
  
Although militaristic value might have been Caesar’s primary focus, his mind was almost 
certainly interested in ulterior motives as well.     
                                                             
4 See also Mommsen, Provinces of Roman Empire. 
5 Millett, Romanization of Britain, 1. 
6 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 81. 
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build on the Loire…”7   In Michael Grant’s Julius Caesar, he supports the idea that one goal of 
the expedition was of a monetary nature: “Caesar himself like many others hoped for lavish loot 
of gold and silver and above all pearls.”8  Besides the material resources, the prestige of 
conquering this mysterious land surely grabbed the attention of Caesar.  Adrian Goldsworthy’s 
text describes the possible allure of the British Isle to Caesar as being adventurism and 
confidence of conquering an exotic land. 9
Another reasonable explanation explored by Grant is the impact of the invasion on one of 
his enemies, Veneti of Brittany.  The tribe of Brittany had a dominant monopoly on all British 
trade at the time.  Caesar’s prior attempts to infiltrate this trade and gain information regarding 
the island had failed simply as little was known about Britain and its people.  This most likely 
intrigued Caesar, thus increasing his desire to investigate.  While these both hold merit, Caesar’s 
ultimate decision probably was intertwined with his conflict in Gaul.  Both Grant and Balsdon 
agree that Caesar knew of the close ties between Britain and Gaul at the time and may have 
based his final decision on this rationale.  According to Grant, “Caesar claimed that they had 
helped his Gallic enemies…they showed a provoking tendency to harbour Gaulish resistance 
movements.”
   
10  Caesar simply could not overlook the support given from the British to the 
Gallic forces who opposed him.  As he observes, Britannia “had close trading links with the 
maritime states in northern Gaul and was an easy refuge for discontented Gauls who might build 
up a centre of resistance from which to launch a counter-attack on the Romans in Gaul.”11
I believe that Caesar’s general curiosity regarding Britain, coupled with trade interests 
   
                                                             
7 Balsdon, Julius Caesar, 82.  
8 Grant, Julius Caesar, 65. 
9 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 270. 
10 Ibid., 65. 
11 Ibid., 82. 
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and a desire to thwart the Britons and Gauls from maintaining their alliance against the Roman 
authority, to be the principal rationale for his undertaking.  To cite him again: “I thought it would 
be useful merely to have visited the island, to have seen what sort of people lived there, and to 
get some idea of the terrain and the harbours…The Gauls knew practically nothing about all 
this…no one goes to Britain except traders, and they are acquainted only with the sea coast and 
the areas that are opposite Gaul.”12
As stated previously, Caesar’s writings served an essential role in reminding the Romans 
of his accomplishments and the initial expedition to Britain very well may have been to an 
attempt on his part to gain popularity, especially because this was an uncharted land.  This is the 
most probable cause for the invasion even though Caesar’s text never overtly mentions it.  To be 
quite blunt about the expedition, Caesar used the British campaign a publicity stunt to further his 
own political aspirations.  Campaigning against the savage Britons in an unknown, wild frontier 
was sure to impress and show Caesar as the brave heroic Roman conqueror.  Caesar employed 
traders to gather information concerning the island, but received little intelligence.  This seems to 
have further peaked Caesar’s interest as cited in his writings:  “I could not find out about the size 
of the island, the names and populations of the tribes…their methods of fighting or the customs 
they had, or which harbours there could accommodate a large number of big ships…I sent Gaius 
Volusenus there…and gave him instructions to make enquiries about all these points and come 
back to me as quickly as he could.”
   
13
III 
        
Uncharacteristic of Caesar, this first attempt at taking Britain is rather poorly planned and 
somewhat of a disaster of an excursion.  As stated in Balsdon, Caesar’s own account of the 
                                                             
12 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 80-81. 
13 Ibid., 81. 
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British expedition was “an all-but complete fiasco in which, providentially, few lives were 
lost.”14  Caesar ordered the invasion in 55; however it was postponed due to the uprising of a 
conflict in the eastern portion of Gaul.  Since winter was rapidly approaching, Caesar was forced 
to scale back his operation and determined that a “reconnaissance expedition” was all that could 
be accomplished within the time allowed.  The force sent for reconnaissance is well documented 
in Caesar’s writings.  “…80 transport ships had been obtained and assembled, enough in my 
opinion to take two legions across to Britain.  There were also some warships…In addition to 
these, there were 18 transports…I assigned to the cavalry.”15
This is Caesar’s first mistake in the campaign.  His impatience and insistence to invade 
Britain so late in the year as winter approached caused a vast number of problems for his fleet.  
His second folly would be lack of information about the land he was invading.  Caesar spend the 
weeks prior to fleet’s departure attempt to learn what he could from the traders who had been to 
island, but found little to be helpful.  Still, Caesar pressed on.  The lack of knowledge regarding 
the coast in the South-Eastern tip of Britain seems to account for the need to circle back toward 
the east.  The army’s misfortunes seem to come immediately upon arrival:   
  The reconnaissance force was 
rather small compare to Caesar’s usual invading armies.  This was a direct result of the lateness 
in the year since the expedition did not set sail from Gaul until August.   
The invasion force sailed after midnight and stood of the cliffs of Dover at 9 or 10 the next morning.  Here 
landing was obviously impossible; so the fleet sailed east, to attempt a landing between Walmer and Deal, 
where a British force, strong in cavalry and chariots, was waiting on the shore.  Disembarkation…was next 
to impossible, until the warships were [maneuvered] close in to land and the enemy brought under a sharp 
assault from javelins, arrows, and slings, which drove them back from the shore…16
 
   
With their landing completed, the real hardships began.  In their haste, the Romans had 
set sail without the proper necessities for their goals.  They lacked heavy equipment and their 
                                                             
14 Balsdon, Julius Caesar, 82-83. 
15 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 81. 
16 Ibid., 83. 
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rations and provisions were grossly inadequate for the upcoming winter.  This gave the British 
troops an advantage as the Romans would be forced to live of the land and forage for supplies.  
These difficulties were quickly compounded the severe weather and the treacherous current of 
the channel which battered and tossed Caesar’s fleet.  “The Roman had taken no precautions, 
however, against the high neap tides in stormy weather and, when  the warships drawn up on the 
land were badly damaged and the transports standing out at sea were battered by colliding with 
one another, the Britons…decided to abandon their submission, and to fight instead.”17
The chaotic arrival caused the Roman cavalry to be scattered and disorganization 
amongst the ranks.  “The fighting was fierce on both sides.  Our men, however, could not keep 
ranks or get firm footing or follow their proper standards, and men from different ships grouped 
themselves under the first standards they came across.  There was great disorder as a result.”
   
18
Despite this distinct edge held by the Britons due to their knowledge of the shores and the 
Roman ineptitude, the Britons never seem to take full advantage of the situation which 
eventually resulted in the concession of the conflict by the British Chieftains.  As terms of the 
surrender, Caesar required that hostages be sent to him back in Gaul.  However, only two of the 
tribes actually sent them.  Caesar used this arrangement as a way to try and save face before 
returning with troops to Gaul from what was a poorly premeditated and inadequately executed 
expedition.    
 
This endeavor as a whole was relatively unsuccessful, but it did accomplish a few items 
including the release of Commius, Caesar’s envoy, who was captured by the Britons prior to the 
assault.  Caesar’s “success” eventually reached the ears of Rome and the senate passed a 
                                                             
17 Balsdon, Julius Caesar, 83. 
18 Caesar, Battle of Gaul, 83. 
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“supplicatio”19
IV 
 of twenty days which was undoubting proposed by Pompey and Crassus.  While 
Caesar doesn’t complete the agenda he had set from the invasion, one thing is for certain; 
crossing the channel was no small feat and justly was worthy of praise.  Caesar’s fortune does 
seem to a drastic upturn during his return in the summer of 54 B.C. 
Drawing upon his experience from the year before, Caesar increased the size of his forces 
as well as choosing a more favorable season for his next campaign into Britain.  “I took with me 
five legions and a force of cavalry equal to that which I had left with Labienus…2,000 
cavalry…more than 800 ships…”20  With the assistance of private ships loyal to him, Caesar set 
sail for a second time with approximately 800 ships in total.  A far cry for the meager 100 or so 
launched in the first assault.  The second improvement Caesar made was one of preparation for 
landing on the harsh British coastline.  The force he had amassed was intended to intimidate the 
Britons who otherwise might have opposed his landing.  Learning for the cliffs of Dover, Caesar 
chose to land at Sandwich Bay which was north of Deal, near the mouth of the Great Stour 
River.  After landing and without any hesitation, Caesar led his forces up the Great Stour to 
Sturry where he met up with the British opposition.  “Caesar decided on an immediate attack, 
and marched out under the cover of darkness with forty cohorts and 1,700 cavalry.”21
While the ensuing battle produced a favorable outcome for Caesar, the victory was 
bittersweet due to his first error of the invasion.  Despite the damages caused in the stormy sea 
and rough coastal terrain which were sustained in the first encounter, the Roman fleet remained 
out at sea instead of portaging.  A gamble to be certain on the part of Caesar and the result 
  Caesar’s 
columns had their enemy on the run with very little to no resistance.   
                                                             
19 Supplicatio is the Roman practice of thanksgiving or supplication to the gods decreed by the senate. 
20 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 91. 
21 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 288. 
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proved to be disastrous.  “The fleet lying at anchor had been badly damaged by storm, and forty 
ships had been lost.  Ten days were then spent in hauling the ships up on shore, extracting skilled 
carpenters from the ranks and sending instructions to Laberius, who had been left in Gaul, to 
send across fresh ships and materials.”22
Even with the delay for repairing the fleet, Caesar’s persistence shone through.  His pride 
and personal ambitions seem to have driven him onward.  With a repeat of the events from the 
year prior on the seas, one might criticize his judgment, questioning his return to the Isle.  In any 
case, this proved to be the opportunity for the British tribes to unite against their new-found 
enemy.  The pause gave the Britons time to recover which led to several tribes, who in normal 
circumstances were hostile to each other, being able to combine to face the imminent threat.  The 
British tribes appointed a war-leader named Cassivellaunus who led them against Caesar’s 
forces.   
  Caesar, it would seem, constantly underestimated the 
fierce, storm-ridden waters of the channel.   
Despite the unification of the British tribes and Caesar’s retreat to regroup with his main 
force, Caesar responds rapidly and advances his troops with a fair amount of success.  A few 
skirmishes broke out, most during patrols and most resulted in the skilled Romans driving back 
their attackers.  Caesar appears to grow restless and turns his attention towards the northwest and 
the region of Thames, home to Cassivellaunus.  The tactic employed by Cassivellaunus’ armies 
was one of small attacks on patrols and forging units instead of an open battle causing Caesar’s 
troops to suffer few, but steady casualties.  Caesar does quickly remedy this situation as he had 
done so many times in the past.  “…Caesar was able to make use of a local ally.  With the army 
was Mandubracius, a prince of the Trinovantes…who had been driven into exile after 
                                                             
22 Balsdon, Julius Caesar, 84. 
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Cassivellaunus had killed his father.”23
The alliance between Caesar and Mandubracius in combination with the defeat at Atrius 
where the fleet was anchored signaled to Cassivellaunus that the resistance was futile.  In late 
September, 54 B.C., Cassivellaunus surrender to Caesar.  The British commander promised 
victorious Caesar hostages and an annual tribute which was to be sent to him in Gaul.  This never 
managed to come to fruition as Caesar would leave the isle and promptly set sail to Gaul where 
issues in the north had escalated, requiring his attention.  
  During this same period, Cassivellaunus organized 
several tribes which resided near Kent to attack the cohorts that Caesar had left to protect the 
ships.  The Roman guards manage to repel the attacking tribesmen forcing them to sustain sever 
losses. 
V 
While Caesar claimed victory over the British, little was actually gained.  Caesar 
addresses the terms of Cassivellaunus’ surrender, “…I accepted their surrender, ordering 
hostages to be given and fixing the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to Rome.  I gave strict 
orders to Cassivellaunus not to molest Mandubracius or the Trinobantes24.”25  The tribute 
promised as well as the hostages agreed upon at the conclusion seem to have been short-lived if 
they occurred at all.  The Romans did gain a newfound trading partner as a direct result of the 
confrontation.  Ultimately, the greatest achievement of Caesar’s campaign is what it led to for 
the future of the Roman Empire.  “Caesar left Britain never to return.  It would be almost a 
century before another Roman army would invade the island and turn it into a province.”26
In my estimation, Caesar seems to be over-credited for the “conquering” of Britain.  
   
                                                             
23 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 290. 
24 Trinobantes, or Trinovantes, was a tribe located in Southeastern Britain during the pre-Roman era. 
25 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 97. 
26 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 292. 
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While his campaigns were militaristically victorious, Caesar was relatively ineffective at 
managing his expeditions.  The tribute awarded to him in his victory is undoubtedly far less than 
the overall expense of the British campaign with regards to the mass loss of ships that his forces 
incurred whist attempting to cross the treacherous English Channel and land on the harsh British 
coastline.  Caesar’s narrative neglects to mention the cost of the war in Britain.  This was most 
likely to avoid lending credence to his rivals back in Rome.  Caesar states the positive elements 
that occurred during the invasion, but it is without doubt a one-sided take on the success of the 
missions.   
For instance, his account of the return to Gaul predominantly describes as a true 
conqueror.  “…I led the army back to the coast, where I found the ships had been 
repaired…because we had a great many prisoners…I decided to make the return journey in two 
trips.  It happen the out of such a fleet of ships…not a single one with troops on broad was 
lost.”27  This section of Caesar’s writings seems to be him bragging about his somewhat 
favorable outcome as a way to gain popularity and win favor back in Rome.  This is not the only 
occasion in which Caesar seems to claim dominance rather immodestly.  “As soon as the 
defeated Britons had regrouped after the rout, they sent envoys to me to ask for peace.  They 
promised to give hostages and in the future do as I ordered.”28
While Caesar doesn’t claim it in De Bello Gallico, it is often implied that his actions in 
55-54 B.C. brought “civilization” to Britain.  To determine Caesar’s impact on British Society, 
we must first analyze the state of Britain society prior to invasions.  Pre-Roman Britain was a 
multi-tribal society in which independent tribes ruled small territories, but no centralized national 
government was employed.   
       
                                                             
27 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 97. 
28 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 83. 
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As previous mentioned trade was a crucial factor in Pre-Roman Britain’s economical 
success.  The Britons had many exportable goods such as metal fabrication, pottery, physical 
resources like tin and iron, and slaves.  However, the British economy was predominantly based 
on agricultural production.  Pre-Roman Britain used the production of crops and cattle as the 
foundation for creating their sophisticated societies prior to the Roman conquest.29
Caesar probably viewed of the Britons as a barbaric and uncouth people. Therefore little 
credence was given to the merits of British culture and society.  As he wrote:   
  While trade 
was mentioned as a reason for Caesar’s initial expedition, the production of crafts for exportation 
were almost exclusively located on the south-eastern coastline directly facing Gaul while 
agricultural production affected both the high and low lands, encompassing all of Britain.       
…their way of life is very like the Gauls.  Most of the tribes living on the interior not grow grain; they live 
on milk and meat and wear skins.  All the Britons dye their bodies with woad, which produces a blue 
colour and gives a wild appearance in battle.  They wear their hair long; every other part of the body, 
except for the upper lip, they shave.  Wives are shared between groups of ten or twelve men, especially 
between brothers and between fathers and sons; but the children of such unions are counted as belonging to 
the man with whom the woman first cohabited.30
 
    
Despite this portrayal of the Britons as savages in Caesar’s text, his same volume has 
been used to refute this argument.  “He refers to a war leader, Casivellaunus; a price, 
Mandubracius; various Kentish Kings as well as Lugotorix, a noble; and social groups which 
may indentified as tribes.”31  Through mentioning these key British figures in the De Bello 
Gallico, he affectively lends legitimacy to the concept of an advanced and, by all accounts, 
civilized societal structure.  “[Britain was] basically hierarchical Gallic society.  This comprised 
upper classes of nobles, warriors and the learned (including priests), who were bound together, 
and to whom the lower orders were attached, by social obligations and bonds of clientage.”32
                                                             
29 Millett, Romanization of Britain, 11. 
   
30 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 94. 
31 Millett, Romanization of Britain, 19. 
32 Ibid., 18. 
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Along with this indirect acknowledgment of British hierarchical society, Caesar does 
mention a few other positives about their civilization. “The population is extremely large, there 
are very many farm buildings…and the cattle are very numerous.  For money they use bronze or 
gold coins, or iron ingots of fixed standard weights.  Tin is found there in the midland…The 
bronze they use is imported.”33
The earliest coins found in this country, apart from stray specimens of Mediterranean fabric brought by 
trade to the south-west, are those of the Gaulish…struck early in the first century B.C. […] these represent 
the coins brought with them by invaders, with some that may have arrived by way of trade…coins began to 
be struck in Britain itself; possibly this was already happening before Caesar’s invasion.
  The use of coinage prior to Caesar’s arrival is measurable 
advancement of British civilization through both external and internal influences, specifically 
trade.  Robin Collingwood reiterates the idea of pre-Roman development of Britain through 
coinage.   
34
 
 
This use of coinage is then used by Collingwood to justify Caesar’s causes for the invasion such 
as its support of his enemy in Gaul and its value as a trade center.   
 Progress was already taking place throughout Britain through the means of trade, 
primarily with Gaul, before their Roman invaders became involved in the process.  While the 
invasion in 55 B.C. led to key developments in the evolution of British society such as 
urbanization, the postulation that Caesar’s victories in the Gaul and Britain led to periods of 
advancement for these conquered peoples is highly unlikely as illustrated in Millett’s work.  
“The campaigns and the subsequent upheaval probably had important consequences for Britain, 
but it seems impossible to distinguish adequately between these and those already in progress as 
a result of previous contacts via Gaul.”35
Caesar’s campaign did in some respects establish advancements in British society.  The 
   
                                                             
33 Caesar, Battle for Gaul, 93. 
34 Collingwood, Roman Britain, 92. 
35 Millett, Romanization of Britain, 31. 
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best example is the urbanization of the British tribes involved in the conflict against Caesar.    
While it was Caesar’s arrival and the eminent danger towards their way of life that united the 
tribes under the leadership of Cassivellaunus, the common interest which led to the unification 
between larger and more-established tribes dissolves almost instantaneously following Caesar’s 
departure from the Isle.  Prior to the campaign in 55 B.C., British tribes were formed as small, 
autonomous communities with no centralized national power to unite them and, in spite of the 
appointment of Mandubracius as chief of the Trinobantes, the strongest of the tribes in the 
southern region, the clans returned to their previous traditions of governance.  This relapse to a 
multi-tribal system of government was actually encouraged by Rome.  “The diplomatic skills 
employed by Rome were designed to divide and dominate.  By lending support to one tribal 
group against another they enhanced inter-tribal stresses and thus prevented the emergence of 
any overt external threat…”36
Although the larger tribes broke their affiliation with one another, the opposite can be 
said for the smaller, more rural clans.  These more isolated tribes found post-invasion Britain to 
be the perfect time to embrace expansion.  “…some groups more remote from the continent, like 
the Brigantes, who seem to have been a loose confederation of five such clans…In the south and 
east the pattern suggests that the permanence of these groupings, and the scale of their 
organization, was changing in the years between the Caesarian expeditions and the Claudian 
conquest.”
 This temporary alliance between tribal leaders was not a result of 
imposed Roman imperialism subsequent left after the confrontation, but more likely a mutual 
partnership in an attempt to reinforce and better their protection against hegemony. 
37
                                                             
36 Millett, Romanization of Britain, 35. 
  The inter-connectivity of these tribes is shown again through the archeological 
confirmation regarding the spread of classical coins in south-eastern.  Also, the best evidence for 
37 Ibid., 21. Subsequent evidence provided is reconstructed from Millett’s text, 21-35. 
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this Romanization comes from the inscriptions, such as Britannia Rex38
  In fact, the Roman occupation post-Caesarian invasion may have actually hindered the 
maturity of Britain.  The immediate period following Caesar’s victory of Gaul was dominated by 
civil war at Rome resulted the newly “conquered” territories in Gaul and Britain being left to 
fend for themselves in rebuilding their war-torn countries.  We find this civil war era as one 
deficient in development for these two provinces until 20 B.C. in which Romanization began to 
resurface. This lack of progress in Gaul assuredly affected the growth in Britain as trade 
diminished during the Roman civil war.  Any movements made during these decades were done 
so independently of Roman influences.    
, on these coins.  This 
appearance on British coinage with Latin terms imprinted on them shows us the blending of the 
two cultures. 
Ultimately, Caesar’s invasions must be considered both a success and a failure.  
Militaristically, the campaign was a strong victory as Caesar’s forces suffered minimal losses 
and on both occasions, the British tribes were forced into submission.  The operation was also 
successful in that Caesar accomplished advancing his political standing by convincing his fellow 
Romans of the glory which had earned for Rome.  However, the incursions into Britain were an 
economic nightmare.  The cost of the expedition was astronomical and the tribute was to be paid 
annually to Caesar was transitory at best.  Unfortunately for Caesar, his ability to imposed 
sanctions on the collecting of the agreed upon imbursement was hampered by his requisite return 
to Rome in 50 B.C. due to the outbreak of civil war.  
While Caesar’s interference in Britain quite possibly hampered more then it assisted their 
development, his actions lead to vast achievements for the Empire.  Caesar’s forays opened the 
door to the possibility of colonizing Britain permanently.  By installing Mandubracius as a client 
                                                             
38 Britannia Rex meaning King of Britain in Latin. 
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king, Caesar successfully set the stage for a return to the Isle.  Caesar was unable to effectively 
establish hegemony in Britain, but he did create the opportunity for complete Roman control of 
the Isle which came to fruition nearly 100 years later in 43 A.D. with the Claudine invasion.  
Caesar’s contribution to the creation of Roman Britain is best summarized by Tacitus.   
Julius Caesar, the first Roman to enter Britain with an army, did intimidate the natives by a victory and 
 secure a grip on the coast.  But he may fairly be said to have merely drawn attention to the island: it was 
 not his to bequeath.39
           
    
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
39 Tacitus, Agricola and Gremania, 63-64.   
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